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Abstract 
 
With the aging of the American population and the increase in demand for health care services, 
we can expect an increase in investment activity in the health care market.  This study focuses on 
whether intra-industry information transfers from going-concern audit opinion announcements 
create contagion or competitive stock price reactions in rival home health care firms.  Data are 
derived from a sample of firms traded on the NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange, or the 
American Stock Exchange.  Average standardized abnormal returns for each firm are computed 
during an 8-year period.  The findings suggest a dominating competitive effect for rival home 
health care and miscellaneous home service firms significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
rom 1993 to 1999 U.S. health care expenditures declined as a share of national income for the longest 
time since the Great Depression.  However, since 1999, health care costs have been growing at a rate 
faster than the overall economy.  Research suggests that health care costs are likely to continue 
growing faster than national income into the foreseeable future (Glied, Spring, 2003).  With the aging of the 
American population and the increase in demand for health care services, we can expect an increase in investment 
activity in the health care market. 
   
This study focuses on whether intra-industry information transfers from going-concern audit opinion 
announcements create contagion or competitive stock price reactions in rival home health care firms.  The 
“contagion effect” occurs when the rival firms’ stock price reactions tend to be in the same direction as the 
announcing firm’s price reaction. The market interprets the new information as an industry-wide problem.  On the 
other hand, when the rival firms’ stock price reaction is in the opposite direction, this is known as the “competitive 
effect”. This occurs when the unfavorable news is perceived to be specific to the announcing firm and therefore 
creates a new competitive position for the rivals of the announcing firm. Wealth is transferred by stock price change 
from the troubled firm to its competitors. 
 
From the investor’s point of view the question is whether a publicly announced going-concern audit 
opinion from one firm significantly impacts the stock price of rival firms and in what direction.  
 
Going-concern opinions are issued when there is doubt whether a firm may remain solvent during the next 
operating period. When going concern opinions are issued, the new negative information released to the public 
typically results in lower stock prices for the announcing firm.  Several studies have examined the information 
content of audit opinions to determine their relationship to stock price changes and their usefulness as a tool for the 
proper timing of buying and selling securities.   
F 
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 Studies by Chow and Rice (1982), Elliott, (1982), and Dodd et al.(1984), found little evidence of a 
significant abnormal return at the filling date of the 10-K or annual report when statements included a qualified audit 
opinion.  Intuitively, this is expected. Stock prices have already adjusted to the new information as it is announced 
through the financial media and by leakage.  According to the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, stock 
prices reflect all new information. 
 
Dopuch et al. (1986), however, found that firms receiving “subject to” qualified audit opinions suffered 
significant negative abnormal stock price reactions coinciding with the public announcement of the auditor’s 
findings.  Dopuch’s research differs from other studies in that it focuses on returns of firms when the “subject to” 
audit opinion is first publicly announced in the media.  Jones (1996) found that going-concern opinions contain new 
information that is subsequently incorporated into the firm’s equity valuation. 
 
Related intra-industry information transfer studies by Aharony and Swary (1983) and Gay, Timme, and 
Yung (1991) found evidence of the contagion effect in the banking industry as a result of bank failures.  Laux, 
Starks, and Yoon (1998) found that rivals of firms announcing large revisions in dividends experience statistically 
insignificant stock price reactions.  Sun and Tang (1998) discovered that downsizing announcements by one firm 
causes a significant stock price reaction by rival firms at the 0.1 level suggesting that the contagion effect is 
dominant over the competition effect.   
 
 Other informational transfer studies have included bankruptcy and earnings announcements.  Lang and 
Stulz (1992), and Cheng and McDonald (1996), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) 
addressed the effects of bankruptcy announcements on industry rivals.  Firth (1976), Foster (1981), Bannister 
(1994), and Clinch and Sinclair (1987) examined the informational transfers associated with earning releases.  These 
informational transfer studies provide a theoretical basis for this research, which deals with negative information 
from “going-concern” audit opinion announcements. 
 
The Problem 
 
 The problem of this paper is to determine whether going-concern audit opinions of announcing firms 
significantly affect returns of rival home health care firms and to determine the direction of stock price changes.  If 
the audit opinion announcement is followed by a significant stock price reaction by rival firms as well as the 
announcing firm, this will provide additional evidence that audit opinions may be a useful tool for home health care 
investors as they buy and sell securities.  
 
Data   
 
 The survey includes only home health care service firms and miscellaneous home and allied services firms 
found under the SIC 8080 and SIC 8090 classification, respectively, reported by Lexis Nexis in the Business Wire 
and The Wall Street Journal Index.  Only those firms traded on the NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange, or the 
American Stock Exchange are included.  Daily financial data are obtained from the CRSP database.  The study 
spans an 8-year period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1996.  This time period is selected because of the new 
audit opinion change, which started in 1988, and the general stability and growth of the economy during the 8-year 
period.  A total of 2 announcing firm and 35 rival firms are included in the sample.  The sample represents 1 
announcing firm and 18 rival firms from SIC 8080 and 1 announcing firm and 17 rival firms from SIC 8090. 
 
Methodology 
 
To determine the announcement effects of going concern opinions on rival firms, abnormal returns are 
calculated for each firm.  Abnormal returns are the difference between the stock’s actual return and its expected 
return as estimated by the single index model.  The single index model is commonly used in event studies dealing 
with announcement effects.  The model is: 
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ARit = Rit – (ai + BiRmt)                   (1) 
 
where: 
 
ARit = the abnormal return on stock i for day t, 
 
Rit = the return on stock i for day t, 
   
Rmt = the return on the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio for day t, and 
 
ai, Bi = the OLS estimates of the market model parameters. 
 
Abnormal returns are computed for each firm during an event window represented by one day before the 
announcement, the day of the announcement, and one day after the announcement date.  In addition, abnormal 
returns of the 10 days before and after the announcement date are statistically tested over a one-year period (250 
trading days) to determine whether there is leakage or slow dissemination of information.  
 
The abnormal returns are statistically tested to determine whether they are significantly different from zero.  
To correct for heteroskedasticity, the test statistics are based on standardized abnormal returns derived from the 
following equation: 
 
SAR it = ARit/Sie                    (2) 
 
where: 
 
 SAR it = the standardized abnormal return of security i on day t, 
 
 ARit = the abnormal return computed for security i on day t, and  
 
 Sie = the standard error of security i over the estimation period. 
 
The standardized average abnormal returns of the industry rival firms are computed from the following 
equation to determine whether these returns are significantly different from zero.    
 
          N 
ASARt = 1/N    SARit                    (3) 
        i=1  
 
where: 
 
ASARt = the average standardized abnormal return on day t, 
 
N = the number of firms announcing or non-announcing, and 
 
SARit  = the standardized abnormal returns computed for firm i on day t. 
 
The average standardized abnormal return is computed for each firm during an event window represented 
by 10 days before and after the announcement date and one day before the announcement, the day of the 
announcement, and one day after the announcement date.  Abnormal returns are statistically tested over a one-year 
period (250 trading days) to determine whether there is leakage or slow dissemination of information.  The average 
standardized abnormal returns are tested with a two-tailed t-test at the .10, .05, and .01 significance levels. The 
findings of Dopuch et al. (1986) and Jones (1996) suggest that abnormal returns for the announcing firms are 
expected to be negative and significant indicating an adverse stock price reaction to the bad news.  Industry rival 
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firms may have average abnormal returns that are positive or negative depending on whether a contagion or 
competitive effect exists. 
 
Findings 
 
 Findings suggest a dominating competitive effect for rival home health care and miscellaneous home 
service firms.  The home health care industry is characterized as an oligopoly market with relatively few firms.  The 
competitive effect tends to predominate as investors sell shares in the financially weak firm and buy shares in 
perceived stronger competing firms.  In Table 1, home health care service firms (SIC 8080) show a 5.18 percent 
average abnormal return for rival firms during the event window of one day before and after the announcement of 
the going-concern opinion.  This is significant at the .01 level with a t-value of 5.152.  Miscellaneous home and 
allied services firms (SIC 8090) in Table 2 shows average abnormal returns of 2.77 percent during the event 
window.  With a t-value of 2.131, this is significant at the .05 level.      
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
The findings suggest that going-concern audit opinions of one firm influence stock prices of other firms in 
the industry.  Average abnormal returns to rival firms are positive and significant at the .01 and .05 level for the SIC 
8080 and SIC 8090 firms, respectively.  This research supports similar findings of Lang and Stulz (1992) who found 
that rivals firms in an oligopolistic industry show a positive reaction to bankruptcy announcements.  Implications of 
this study tend to support the efficient market hypothesis in that stock prices rapidly reflect all new information 
available.  These findings are important to institutional and private investors of home health care securities as they 
seek to maximize stock returns as audit information is announced.  Stock prices are generally expected to increase in 
rival health care firms as going-concern audit opinions are announced by a competing firm.  
 
 
Table 1:  Average Abnormal Returns to Rivals of  Firms Announcing a Going Concern Opinion:  Sic 8080 
Day Relative To 
Announcement Date: 
Average Abnormal Return: 
(%) 
 
T-value: 
  
Number of Observations: 
- 10 0.1661 0.454  18 
- 9 0.7746 0.761  18 
- 8 -1.1298 -0.611  18 
- 7 -0.6574 -0.748  18 
- 6 -2.2911 -1.471  18 
- 5 -0.2027 -0.667  18 
- 4 1.7434 1.766  18 
- 3 -3.4785 -2.664 ** 18 
- 2 -1.1848 -0.465  18 
- 1 0.8604 0.561  18 
0 3.0005 2.788 ** 18 
+ 1 1.3206 1.803 * 18 
(-1,1) 5.1814 5.152 *** 18 
+ 2 -0.8908 -0.418  18 
+ 3 1.7868 1.554  18 
+ 4 0.4578 0.351  18 
+ 5 -0.0304 0.713  18 
+ 6 1.6455 1.866 * 18 
+ 7 1.8491 1.401  18 
+ 8 -3.8252 -3.203 *** 18 
+ 9 2.1379 1.723  18 
+ 10 -1.5072 -1.523  18 
*** Significant at the 1% level under a two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 5% level under a two-tailed test. 
* Significant at the 10% level under a two-tailed test. 
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Table 2:  Average Abnormal Returns To Rivals Of Firms Announcing A Going Concern Opinion:  Sic 8090 
Day Relative To 
Announcement Date: 
Average Abnormal Return: 
(%) 
T-value:  Number of Observations: 
- 10 -1.9064 -0.775  17 
- 9 3.1941 1.162  17 
- 8 0.9834 1.594  17 
- 7 -1.8701 -1.725  17 
- 6 -0.1914 -0.192  17 
- 5 3.0519 1.403  17 
- 4 -2.6141 -1.025  17 
- 3 -0.2619 -0.412  17 
- 2 1.5825 1.367  17 
- 1 0.9941 1.275  17 
0 2.8386 0.561  17 
+ 1 -1.0615 0.293  17 
(-1,1) 2.7711 2.131 ** 17 
+ 2 0.0789 0.293  17 
+ 3 -1.7491 -2.434 ** 17 
+ 4 0.3609 -0.162  17 
+ 5 2.5867 0.361  17 
+ 6 -2.8203 -1.005  17 
+ 7 1.1446 0.352  17 
+ 8 0.3612 0.418  17 
+ 9 3.2521 2.529 ** 17 
+ 10 -1.2648 -0.557  17 
*** Significant at the 1% level under a two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 5% level under a two-tailed test. 
* Significant at the 10% level under a two-tailed test. 
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